ify for public education or health benefits. This can produce large interregional wage differences. Recent research indicates that removing such mobility restrictions would reallocate labor across areas, reduce wage differences, and lower income inequality (Whalley and Zhang 2007) .
The World Bank's World Development Report 2009 (WDR 2009 ) provides a new framework for territorial development, arguing that policies should focus on integrating lagging and leading regions-and not be exclusively concerned with stimulating growth in lagging regions. The WDR 2009 highlights that enabling geographic mobility of labor and improving economic connectivity between lagging and leading regions are key ingredients for countries to gain from the geographic concentration of economic activities along with convergence in living standards. Which policies can help? Policies that are spatially blind in design can have the spatially sharpest effects. These include progressive income tax policies, the achievement of national minimum standards in basic health and education indicators, and removal of barriers to labor mobility. In addition, spatially connective policies such as transport and communication improvements physically link lagging and leading regions. Spatially targeted incentives should be policy instruments of last resort, only to be used when factor mobility is weak due to internal divisions from ethnic and linguistic fractionalization. In such cases, these type incentives may be considered but only after investing in information to identify sources of comparative advantage and to amplify the benefits from spatially blind and spatially connective policies.
In this paper, we focus on one aspect of the territorial integration challengethe migration of labor from lagging to leading regions within countries. In particular, we are interested in understanding migration decisions in Brazila large developing country with no formal barriers to labor mobility. During years of high economic growth in the 1960s and 1970s, almost 40 million people left the countryside for cities-with a large share of those migrants moving from the lagging Northeast to the leading Southeast region (World Bank 2008) . And even today, young workers migrate in large numbers.
Why people migrate depends on forces that "pull," as well as those that "push," them to leave. On the one hand, one big pull is economic density in leading regions of countries. Differences in economic opportunity between lagging and leading regions often provide the main motivation for internal migration. On the other hand, people are pushed off their land where agriculture is in severe decline, by the pressures of population growth, and where environmental change makes cultivation no longer viable. Historically, droughts have had sudden and prolonged impact on the distribution of the population, particularly in sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.
1 Conflict has also pushed people to migrate across sub-Saharan Africa, and in many other developing regions.
But in many low-and middle-income countries, another important push propels internal migration-the lack of adequate public services in rural areas or in economically lagging regions. To a large extent, this topic has been overlooked in empirical analysis of migration decisions. However, in reality, the location of schools, health care centers, hospitals, and public and private amenities is correlated with the location of economic activity. In Africa, disparities in school enrollment and neonatal care between cities, towns, and villages are attributable to the near absence of schools and health facilities in outlying areas.
2 Evidence from Central Asia shows that in the isolated parts of Tajikistan, schools are inadequately heated, drinking water is scarce, and there are no arrangements to clear garbage and sewage.
3 So as market forces encourage the concentration of economic mass, public services are underprovided in smaller towns, villages, and lagging regions. 4 Although voluntary, migration in response to limited access to public services is more likely to add to congestion costs in cities than to contribute to agglomeration benefits.
In the empirical analysis, we examine the relative contribution of economic opportunities and amenities in leading areas ("pull") and the lack of access to basic public services in rural and lagging regions ("push") on internal migration decisions of Brazilians. We use household-level data that are representative samples down to the second level of subnational administration (for example, counties in the United States). These data record migration history over a shortterm horizon (for example, 5 years) and relative to birth location. 5 Our empirical approach employs repeated cross-sectional data to control for time-invariant unobserved local attributes in a utility-based model of individual migration decisions. Even the best dataset will necessarily lack information about important amenities, local public goods, and geo-economic features that might motivate migration behavior. If these unobserved factors are correlated with migration determinants about which we do have information (for example, access to piped water, sewage, electricity, or health care), they can bias our conclusions about the role those observed determinants play in migration decisions. Following Bayer, Keohane and Timmins (2009), we incorporate repeat cross-sectional data on migration behavior into a two-stage discrete choice model that allows us to easily overcome many of these biases, with important implications for our conclusions regarding many of these factors.
Our analysis confirms the importance of public service differentials in influencing long-run migration decisions. In particular, we find that in addition to looking for better jobs, working-age men migrated from the lagging Northeast region to get better access to basic public services such as piped water, electricity, and health care. How much are migrants willing to pay for public services? A full-time minimum wage worker earning Rs$7 per hour (about US$2.30 in February 2008) was willing to pay Rs$390 per year in compensating wage differentials to have access to better health services, Rs$84 for better access to sewage services, and Rs$42 for better access to electricity.
What do these findings imply for urbanization and territorial development policies? First, rather than only focusing on providing spatially targeted incentives to stimulate economic growth in lagging regions, policies should focus on building human capital that enables people to become geographically mobile. Second, investing in basic public services and core infrastructure in lagging regions should be of high priority. Access to these services will directly improve welfare in lagging regions and will reduce the push factors that induce migration. By overlooking the provision of basic social services in economically lagging regions, policymakers can inadvertently influence the choice to migrate, motivating households to move for reasons other than to exploit economic opportunities. While the move improves the welfare of these individuals, the economy may end up worse off as they are more likely to add to congestion costs in cities rather than to contribute to agglomeration benefits.
The paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, we discuss the analytic model, which uses a simple model of location choice that depends upon earning opportunities and local public goods to illustrate that the latter matter in individual migration decisions. In the third section, we describe the results from estimating the model. In the last section, we offer our conclusions.
Modeling the Determinants of Migration
Theories of economic growth and convergence have motivated economic thinking on what causes people to move and what such movements mean. Whether couched in a classical framework or in the recent models of endoge-nous growth, when people are free to move, they will pursue private gain and compete away differences in wages between locations.
6 There is abundant empirical work identifying the determinants of migration decisions, whereby migrants respond to geographic differences in incomes or wages. In the 1960s and 1970s, aggregate data at the subnational level were used to estimate modified gravity models of migration inspired by Newton's law of gravitation. In these models, migration flows are directly related to population size at the origin and destination and inversely related to distance between locations. These gravity models considered the effects of the push and pull factors in both areas of origin and destination. Today, this approach-which can only broadly describe population movements-has been replaced by finer micro-econometric methods (Lall, Selod, and Shalizi 2006). 7 The typical migration equation at the microlevel specifies a binary variable (moving versus staying) as function of a set of explanatory variables. This approach focuses on the decision of individuals originally located in a given area to migrate. The migration choice can be modeled with a linear probability, a probit, or a logit model. One of the main problems with this approach is that it groups all potential destinations into a single "rest of the world" destination. This is often due to the lack of available and measurable data and because multivariate analyses are often less tractable. However, this is an important problem as potential migrants face a set of multiple destinations with different local opportunities. Workers may not only decide whether to migrate but also decide where to migrate, and they may be making these choices simultaneously. Without modeling the choice of where to migrate, it is impossible to determine the relative roles of different determinants of migration behavior. An emerging body of empirical analysis addresses this issue by considering polychotomous choice models, usually multinomial logits. This type of model is used by Falaris (1987) who estimates a nested logit of individual internal migration across twenty-three states in Venezuela grouped in seven regions. Distance between states is used as a proxy for moving costs. Consistent with what theory would predict, he finds that wage differentials do indeed affect migration decisions in Venezuela. Our model of migration choice builds on this approach.
Somik V. Lall, Christopher Timmins, and Shouyue YuModel
We first present a simple model that is geared toward the recovery of the value placed on specific local public services and amenities by potential migrants. The model as presented explicitly controls for local public services and amenities but does so nonparametrically, making it difficult to learn about the value of any one service or amenity in particular (such as access to electricity).
We begin by defining the individual indirect utility function of a potential migrant. As is done in traditional migration models, we assume that individuals receive utility from wage compensation while trying to avoid higher migration costs (Falaris 1987) . In addition, we assume that individuals enjoy local public goods and amenities such as access to piped water and electricity. Consider an individual i from origin location j. We can write this person's utility, should he or she choose to reside in location k, as the following:
where w i,j,k = log wage earned by individual i in location k, D j,k = migration distance (in kilometers from origin j to location k), X k = observable (by the econometrician) attributes of location k, ~k = unobservable (by the econometrician) attributes of location k, and i,j,k = idiosyncratic unobservable (by the econometrician) determinants of individual i's utility in location k.
For the purpose of easy interpretation, we rescale equation 2 so that the marginal utility of the natural log of wage is normalized to be 1. We remove the "~" from each parameter to reflect this rescaling.
(2)
We can now interpret estimates of ␥ as the marginal willingness to pay (as a percentage of wage) for a one-unit increase in any of the attributes in X k .
This model makes a few simplifying assumptions. First, the migration cost is simply related to the migration distance. This is typical of previous analyses, but the model could be extended to treat migration cost as a function of the difference between origin and destination attributes. Second, we do not model the individual's labor market participation decision (that is, the individual's choice of working hours). Moreover, we also ignore the possibility of involuntary unemployment but plan to account for this possibility in future work by including unemployment rates in X k .
8 This is in line with the emphasis in the Harris-Todaro model on expected labor market returns.
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Suppose there are K locations and that individual i can choose one of them as his or her destination. This individual will then choose the utility maximizing location. If we assume that i,j,k~i .i.d. Type 1 Extreme Value, the probability that individual i chooses a particular location k as his or her destination can be written as follows: (3) Since the marginal utility of log wage has been rescaled to be 1, the model dictates that we explicitly estimate the logit scale parameter µ. Let N denote the total population. We would like to maximize the probability associated with the chosen destination of each individual (k i * ). This implies the following loglikelihood function, where
is an indicator function that takes the value 1 if individual i chooses location k i * , such that (4) Using equation 3, the model predicts that the population of location k would be (5) which, in equilibrium, should be equal to the observed population of location k (pop k ). This applies to all K locations. That is, in equilibrium,
We use this information to employ the two-stage estimation procedure in Bayer and Timmins (2007) . In the first stage, we define the mean utility (that is, separate from idiosyncratic components) enjoyed by all migrants who choose location k:
and obtain estimates of µ, ␦, and { k } K k=1 . Bayer and Timmins (2007) show how, on the basis of equation 6, the contraction mapping formulated in Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) and Berry (1994) can be used to simply calculate the vector { k } K k=1 for any guess at remaining utility parameters [µ, ␦] and an arbi-
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trary normalization (for example, the average value of k is set equal to zero). We can then estimate our parameters [µ, ␦,
] with a maximum likelihood procedure using the log-likelihood function, equation 4.
In the second stage, we decompose the estimates { k } K k=1 from the first stage according to equation 7. This would yield a vector containing the individual's marginal willingness to pay (as a percentage of the wage) for each element of the vector X k . Since k and X k are likely correlated with each other (for example, cities with desirable public goods may be high quality in other unobserved dimensions), the simple ordinary least square (OLS) estimator of ␥ will be biased. Ideally, one might use an instrument for each endogenous component of X k . Given the number of potentially endogenous local attributes that might be important to the individual's migration decision, however, this solution is not practical. Instead, we deal with this problem by assuming that any correlation between X k and k is only with components of X that do not vary over time (that is, k ). (8) Assuming E[⌬X k ⌬ k ] = 0, differencing this expression over time will remove any source of bias. While it is unlikely that this assumption holds perfectly, in practice it is a far better option than simply ignoring the role of correlated unobserved local attributes, and it will likely eliminate much of any potential endogeneity bias.
Practically, we expand the first stage of the model to include data from two census years, restricting the parameters [µ, ␦] to remain fixed over that time period. We then solve for two vectors,
, using an extension of the Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995) contraction procedure. Finally, the unbiased estimates of ␥ can be obtained by estimating (9) where
The 1991 and 2000 Brazil censuses provide information on current residence and birth state for most individuals. Therefore, we define migration by an individual's current location relative to his birth state. That is, we use a long-run measure of migration. One could also employ a short-run definition of migration-that is, relative to where the individual was living one, two, or five years before-if necessary data are available. We use 3,659 AMCs (minimally comparable areas) as destination locations and twenty-seven states as origin locations. AMCs are similar to counties but are aggregated in some cases to make them comparable over time.
For each census year, we focus our attention on household heads who were between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-five. In this way, it is less likely that the same household head will show up in both the 1991 and 2000 samples. Moreover, by using individuals from this cohort, we focus our attention on first migration decisions-those made after an individual initially finishes school or leaves his or her parents' home. This move may be accompanied by marriage or the birth of a child, for example. Our goal is to avoid mixing these individuals with older individuals who may be making location decisions according to retirement considerations or who may have made location decisions many years in the past. Finally, we also control for individual attributes, since amenities and employment opportunities are likely to have different effects on migration behavior for different types of individuals. Given that age has already been restricted, we further divide those household heads according to their education level. Household heads with postsecondary education are excluded from the analysis.
The Brazilian censuses also contain information on employment and income. Recall that our current model ignores the possibility that the individual would be unable to find work. We therefore keep only those household heads who were employed. In the 2000 census, over 90 percent of all Brazilians between the ages of twenty-five and thirty-five (with less than college education) reported that they were working. Thus, dropping unemployed household heads is not a major problem in this context. For each household head in our sample, we can observe the individual's wage in the destination location where he or she actually resides. However, to model the individual's destination location decision, we need to know what the individual would earn in every other location. Properly recovering these counterfactual wages can be quite difficult. In this part of the paper, we adopt the relatively simple approach of using the average wage earned by conditionally similar individuals in those other locations. Practically, this means that we run a separate log wage regression for each AMC: (11) where Z i is a vector of variables describing individual i, including age, sex, education level, and occupation dummy variables, and ␣ k is a set of wage parameters for location k. Table 1 reports summaries of regression procedures to predict counterfactual wages.
We model moving costs as a function of migration distance, which is calculated from the longitude and latitude of the center of the individual's birth state and destination AMC. Except for a log-linear function of migration distance, we may also specify moving costs using a set of distance dummies.
Our primary interest is in the role played by regional differences in local public services on migration decisions. We focus on variables describing local infrastructure (such as percentage of households with access to piped water, sewage, and electric lights), access to health care (such as number of hospitals), and network infrastructure (for example, transportation costs to the state capital and São Paulo). Any list of local attributes would, however, necessarily be incomplete. As described above, we use census data from two years to control nonparametrically for all local attributes that do not vary over time. Table 2 summarizes regional differences in access to public services. Differences in water and sanitation services are quite stark. Access to piped water is 52 percent in the Northeast compared with 72 percent in the Southeast. In terms of access to sewage facilities, connection rates in the Northeast were 13 percent in 2000, 58 percent in the Southeast.
Main Findings on Migration Choice
We find strong evidence that individuals' migration decisions depend upon more than just returns in the labor market. Ignoring these nonpecuniary determinants may cause us to overstate the role of wages in driving migration decisions. This can be seen in tables 3 and 4, which describe the results of the procedure described above for those with less (zero to six years) and more (seven to twelve years) education.
Columns 1 to 4 of the lower panel of each table describe the results of crosssectional procedures applied to each census year individually, ignoring moving costs. The likely effects of omitted variable bias are evident in the estimates of the utility parameters on access to piped water and number of hospitals. It is likely that each of these variables (particularly the number of hospitals in an AMC) is correlated with other desirable urban amenities. This has the effect of biasing upward the coefficient on each of these variables for both education groups. Access to electricity has a counterintuitive sign or is insignificant. While access to sewage shows the expected sign for those in the lower education group, it exhibits the counterintuitive sign (although it is insignificant) for the higher education group in 1991. In all, these results appear to be unstable a. "Moving costs" are measured as the natural log of the number of kilometers (in 1,000s) from the AMC of residence to the center of the individual's birth state.
over time and likely reflect omitted variable biases caused by unobserved urban amenities. Columns 5 to 6 report the results of a differencing procedure that ignores the costs of migration. While controlling nonparametrically for time-invariant unobservable local attributes, this specification ignores the fact that it may be difficult, for example, for someone born in the Northeast to migrate to locations in the Southeast or South of Brazil. The signs of most of the coefficients correspond to expectations; very few of the parameter estimates are, however, statistically significant (only access to electricity and the number of hospitals for those in the lower education group and the number of hospitals for those in the higher education group are significant). For both groups, an increasing cost of transporting commodities to São Paulo (a measure of national market connectedness) enters negatively into utility, while the cost of transporting commodities to the nearest state capital (a measure of local market connectedness) enters positively. This latter result is counterintuitive.
Columns 7 to 8 report the results of our most complete model. Here, we differentiate over time and control for migration costs. Doing so, we find that percentage with sewage services (percent sewage), number of hospitals (no. of hospitals), and transportation cost to the nearest state capital (SC) all enter significantly and with the expected sign into the utility of those with less education, while percentage with electricity (percent electric light) and percentage with piped water (percent piped water) are only marginally insignificant. This reflects the fact that local public goods are indeed important in this group's migration decision process. For the more educated group, number of hospitals and percentage with electricity both enter significantly with the expected sign. For this group, however, transportation cost to the nearest state capital and percentage with sewage services do not seem to matter. It is likely that this group is not on the margin in terms of its access to sewage services (or piped water, for that matter), so a marginal improvement in access to either of these public goods is not likely to provide much inducement for choosing a particular destination. Increasing access to electricity and hospitals is more likely to be important for this group on the margin.
For both groups, increased transportation cost to São Paulo enters into utility positively and significantly in this specification. This result may initially seem counterintuitive. However, after controlling for access to health care and other forms of infrastructure (such as proximity to a state capital), this variable may simply be a proxy for a low cost of living (a desirable amenity).
We can interpret the coefficients on each variable as the percentage of the individual's wage that he is willing to pay for a one unit increase in each vari-able. For example, an individual from the higher (seven to twelve years) education group would be willing to pay 4.17 percent of wages in exchange for an additional hospital in the individual's AMC and 1.15 percent of wages in exchange for an additional percentage point of the population being covered by electric lights. An individual from the lower education group would be willing to pay only 0.3 percent of wages in exchange for another percentage point increase in the population covered by electric lights but would be willing to pay 0.6 percent in exchange for an additional percentage point increase in the population with access to sewage services. Since we use the log wage in the model, it reflects that people with higher education pay a smaller percentage of their wage for amenities. But their absolute payment for amenities is higher than that of people with lower education. And for some amenities, bettereducated people are not marginal, and therefore they do not really benefit from an improvement at the margin (that is, connecting more people up to a sewer line likely does not help a rich person, since he or she was probably already hooked up to the sewer line, but the less-educated person is more likely to benefit from that improvement).
Conclusions
In this paper, we examine the determinants of internal migration, paying particular attention to the role of amenities such as access to health and education services and urban infrastructure in migration decisions of working-age individuals. We use Brazilian census data for the analysis and find that the poor from the country's lagging regions not only migrate in search of better economic outcomes but that they are often pushed from their hometowns where they are deprived of access to basic public services such as health care, water supply, and electricity.
These findings have important implications for territorial development and urbanization policies in Brazil. First, economic activities in industry and services are concentrated in the country's leading areas, benefiting from internal scale economies as well as positive externalities from agglomeration. In Brazil and elsewhere, fiscal incentives and infrastructure programs that have tried to develop industrial clusters in lagging regions have been largely unsuccessful (World Bank 2008 , Lall, Selod, and Shalizi 2006 , Carvalho, Lall, and Timmins 2006 , World Bank 2005 . However, our results show that people have been leaving lagging regions in search of better economic opportunities-particularly in the Southeast. Policies should encourage this mobility of labor, and the best way is to help in improving human capital accumulation in lagging regions. Considerable evidence shows that education is the best instrument for overcoming the barriers of distance. One of the biggest success stories comes from the United States, where a rise in the schooling of African Americans is believed to have been an important causal factor behind their "Great Migration" out of the South (Margo 1988) .
The Northeast in Brazil has the worst education attainment in the countrythe labor force has 4.6 years of schooling compared with the average of 6.4 years nationwide and 7.3 years in the Southeast. There are estimates suggesting that average incomes in the Northeast would increase by more than half if the local populace had the same education profile as people in the Southeast have (Mont'Alverne and others 2004). And neoclassical economic thinking suggests that mobility of labor will contribute to interregional convergence. Since higher wages at the destination reflect an initial shortage of workers relative to capital-or a large endowment of capital per worker-the arrival of new migrants will slow the accumulation of capital per worker and the growth of wages. In contrast, the accumulation of capital per worker in the places migrants leave will speed up as they go, accelerating wage growth for workers who stay behind. By this mechanism, incomes in different locations are predicted to eventually converge.
Second, improving access to public services in lagging regions should be a high priority. While the geographic concentration of economic activities generates increasing returns and helps accelerate economic growth, public policies can help convergence in access to social services. By overlooking the provision of basic social services in economically lagging regions-such as schools, primary health centers, and even basic public infrastructure-policymakers can inadvertently influence the choice to migrate, motivating households to move for reasons other than to exploit economic opportunities. While the move improves the welfare of these individuals, the economy may end up worse off as they are more likely to add to congestion costs in cities than to contribute to agglomeration benefits. Also, by improving the provision of these services, policymakers can directly improve welfare of the poor in lagging regions.
Comments
Alex Anas: This interesting article is about migration from economically lagging rural regions to economically leading urban regions in developing countries. The authors present an empirical study focusing on migration into Brazil's vibrant Southeast from the lagging areas of the country.
Of central interest in any empirical study should be the theoretical determinants that would be important in formulating a well-specified model for empirical analysis. My comments have two parts. In the first, I will examine the question: What does the theory in urban economics tells us about the determinants of rural-to-urban migration? In the second part I will comment on selected aspects of the empirical analysis provided by the authors.
The Determinants of Rural-to-Urban Migration: Lessons from Urban Economics
The open-city model of urban economics is particularly applicable to the situation of a developing country with a large rural population. In figure 1 , I illustrate this model in full. The x-axis measures the population concentrated in a leading region or large urban area. The horizontal line is the utility that a citizen can obtain by living in a lagging or rural area. The figure assumes that regardless of how many people concentrate in the urban area, the level of utility in the rural area remains unchanged. The inverse U-shaped curve is the level of utility per person that can be obtained in the urban area as a function of the urban population.
Note that when the urban population is small, adding more people to the urban area increases utility because of agglomeration effects that build quickly, but as the urban area grows and density increases, externalities such as crowding, traffic congestion, poor sanitation, and so on also increase and the level of utility per person begins to fall (represented by the declining portion of the inverse U-shaped curve). As long as the urban utility level is above the rural one, rural to urban migration continues. This migration dynamic means that the stable equilibrium population of the urban area will be bigger than the optimal population. The former occurs where the declining portion of the inverse U-shaped urban utility curve intersects the rural utility level. The optimal population occurs where the urban utility curve peaks.
The open-city model implies an inefficient allocation of resources: urban populations are larger than optimal and cannot achieve a higher level of utility than rural populations can obtain. If this seems counterintuitive at first, recall the reasons for it. The higher concentration of population in the urban area has caused rents to go up and the unpriced pollution, sanitation, and congestion externalities to increase. Meanwhile the presence of human capital, agglomeration, and other positive externalities in urban areas means that urban producers can offer lower wages (than otherwise) to attract workers to the urban area. The final result is encapsulated by the well-known capitalization hypothesis. Attractive migration destinations are places where, ceteris paribus, land is expensive and labor compensation is relatively low. Unattractive migration Optimal population destinations do not abound with positive externalities, but they are rich in the absence of at least some of the negative externalities. They are characterized by relatively higher wages and lower rents.
The authors mention the role of public services in migration. How do public service improvements affect the rural to urban migration equilibrium? The answer is in figure 1. Suppose that politicians invest in infrastructure improvements in the urban area. Ceteris paribus, the inverse U-shaped curve shifts up as these investments make the urban area more attractive for migrants. But after the additional rural-to-urban migration occurs, the new stable equilibrium urban population increases without any gain in urban utility. What has happened is that the benefit of better public services has become capitalized into rents as more people have flocked to the urban area to benefit from the improved services.
The above dismal prediction of the open-city model poses a public policy dilemma. It is obvious from figure 1 that permanent welfare improvements can come only by raising the rural utility level, not by raising the urban one. An increase in rural utility would decongest cities, reducing the urban population toward its optimum level. In reality, however, increasing the rural utility level is a virtually insurmountable challenge. The reason is that the lack of scale economies in the widely dispersed rural populations would require gargantuan and spatially ubiquitous spending by governments seeking to improve rural utility levels. By contrast, investing in flashy urban projects (for example, a new subway system in the large city) is both cheaper and much more appealing to voters who perceive these investments as beneficial even though all they do is to increase the urban size without creating real benefits after the additional migration that is induced.
I believe the open-city model to be important in understanding the welfare economics of rural-to-urban migration. The model is also useful in deflating potential myths that have emerged recently. One of these myths is mentioned by the authors. They note that the hukou system of urban population controls in China have not been beneficial. According to the open city model, however, this is far from clear. The answer is again in figure 1 . Suppose that the government limits migration from rural to urban areas so that the urban population is near its optimal size. This is a nonequilibrium solution in which the urban area is put on a higher utility level than is the rural area, by shutting the door (or greatly raising the cost) on the rural population that would migrate there. But the result of this intrusive policy is that the average utility level in the country is higher than the rural utility level. More precisely, those who migrated to the cities despite the hukou restrictions clearly had a benefit, or otherwise they would not have done so. Those who stayed in the rural areas did not see their utility lowered, and those who were already in the urban area enjoy a higher level of utility because the hukou prevented the full incremental migration that would have further congested the urban area. Loss in agglomeration benefits are irrelevant as long as the hukou policy is active on the declining portion of the inverse U-shaped curve, where more population creates more costs than benefits.
There are other insights from urban economics that bear on the article's central theme. One of these has to do with the role of social networks in rural-to-urban migration. More precisely, consider the likely scenario that migrants move to the city because their friends or relatives have already moved there. Such social networks have ambiguous effects on economic opportunity. On the one hand, having a friend in the big city should make the migrant more willing to move there for a lower wage. On the other hand, the friends can help the migrant find cheaper housing, a better-paying job, or better access to public services. While I am inclined to believe that the latter effects dominate the former, I know of no formal research that either supports or contradicts my intuition.
Finally, there is the well-known model of Harris and Todaro that explained rural-to-urban migration in the face of high and persistent unemployment in the urban areas. As my colleague Edwin Mills pointed out during the conference, it may indeed be the case that the supposed involuntary unemployment of rural migrants in the large cities may be all smoke. It may indeed be the case that hard-to-observe informal and even illegal employment is keeping such migrants busy indeed. But, in the context of the authors' article, there is yet another reason to be cognizant of this model. The authors have stressed the importance of better urban public services as a cause of rural-to-urban migration. If these factors are really important, then it should be at least in part true that keeping the expected urban wage constant, higher unemployment or longer unemployment spells are tolerated by migrants to urban areas with better and more accessible urban services. Perhaps this is a hypothesis that the authors could test in the future.
A Few Thoughts on the Model Used by the Authors
An attractive aspect of the article is the use of a discrete choice model (logit) to explain the migration decision. The authors contribute meaningfully to that literature.
One of the less satisfying aspects of the empirical model is the specification of the utility function in which wages are entered specifically as explanatory variables but rents are ignored, which does not account well for the capitalization hypothesis. Again, wearing my urban economist hat, I have trouble with this. Apart from data limitations on rents, I can only anticipate a possible justification that I have heard before from others but never agreed with. One might be that rents at the migration destination k are indirectly captured by the X k variables, so they are endogenous not exogenous. But so are wages. As well, rents paid by various types of migrants will vary in the same destination because of the immensely sophisticated differentiation that occurs in housing markets, just as wages will also vary (which the authors do take into account) because of the differentiation that occurs in the labor markets.
Finally, I would have liked to see the wage elasticities of labor supply calculated from the estimated logit. Since the model treats considerable variation among migrants and includes a variety of labor destinations, it would be of interest to learn how the elasticity of labor supply varies among larger and smaller urban destinations and for different types of migrants. Jan K. Brueckner: Migration to cities from the rural or other disadvantaged areas of developing countries has been a long-time focus of development economists, who often rely on the conceptual framework of the Harris-Todaro model. That model attempted to explain the puzzle of continuing migration flows in the face of urban unemployment by identifying expected income, in a probabilistic sense, as the force luring migrants toward cities. The key insight is that, when urban wages are sufficiently high relative to rural wages, an appreciable likelihood of urban unemployment need not deter migrants since the city offers an attractive expected income despite the low chance of actually finding a high-wage urban job. In a Harris-Todaro equilibrium, rural-urban migration stops when the urban unemployment rate has risen to the point where rural incomes and expected urban incomes are equal.
In addition to this unemployment mechanism, additional forces may play a role in equilibrating rural-urban migration. Once such force, explored in a series of my own papers, is escalation in the urban cost of living in response to migration, particularly land and housing costs. As migrants crowd into cities, housing costs rise, and this escalation reduces the urban standard of living and limits the appeal of further migration. In this extended model, urban unemployment and rising housing prices jointly serve to equilibrate rural-urban migration flows.
Such migration flows also depend on other elements of the economic environment in the origin and destination regions. While wages, unemployment rates, and housing costs are among these elements, the paper by Lall, Timmins, and Yu brings a welcome focus on another overlooked factor: public service levels. Superior access to public health facilities, schools, water, electricity, and sewage may motivate migration just as powerfully as the lure of better incomes. The chapter provides new and useful empirical estimates that document the strength of these attractive forces.
Even though this evidence shows that public services do indeed play a role in migration decisions, the equilibration forces described above do not operate so explicitly in this case. In particular, even though unemployment and housing costs rise as migrants pour into cities, an urban government may be committed to maintaining public service levels, which would then not deteriorate as the population swells. In this case, the labor and housing markets must do all the equilibrating work. However, if public service budgets are fixed or do not increase to match population growth, then public service levels will decline as the migrant population swells, and this force will operate in conjunction with rising unemployment and higher housing costs to limit the extent of migration. Thus, public service "congestion" could be added to the list of equilibrating forces in an expanded Harris-Todaro model.
Regardless of which view applies, Lall, Timmins, and Yu have identified an underappreciated policy lever that governments might use to exert control over migration flows. If a national government wishes to slow migration into a country's largest cities from rural areas or smaller hinterland cities, it could take steps to increase spending on public services in these origin regions. Given the findings of the authors, such spending would make migration less attractive, retarding the unwanted migration flows. In countries such as China, where migration flows are massive and tend to subvert the government's hukou system, improvement of rural public services would provide a means for limiting population pressure in the largest cities. A similar policy could be employed in Brazil, the focus of the authors' empirical work.
